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 Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative 
Deterrence 
THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN* AND JAMES C. HATHAWAY** 
Developed states have what might charitably be called 
a schizophrenic attitude towards international refugee 
law.  Determined to remain formally engaged with 
refugee law and yet unwavering in their commitment 
to avoid assuming their fair share of practical respon-
sibilities under that regime, wealthier countries have 
embraced the politics of non-entrée, comprising ef-
forts to keep refugees away from their territories but 
without formally resiling from treaty obligations.  As 
the early generation of non-entrée practices—visa 
controls and carrier sanctions, the establishment of 
“international zones,” and high seas deterrence—
have proved increasingly vulnerable to practical and 
legal challenges, new forms of non-entrée predicated 
on interstate cooperation have emerged in which de-
terrence is carried out by the authorities of the home 
or a transit state, or at least in their territory. 
The critical question we address here is whether such 
cooperation-based mechanisms of non-entrée are—as 
developed states seem to believe—capable of insulat-
ing them from legal liability in ways that the first gen-
eration of non-entrée strategies were not.  We show 
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that three evolving areas of international law—
jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability for 
aiding or assisting—are likely to stymie many if not 
all of the new forms of non-entrée.  Powerful states 
are thus faced with a trade-off between the efficiency 
of non-entrée mechanisms and the ability to avoid re-
sponsibility under international refugee law.  If, as we 
believe probable, the preference for more rather than 
less control persists, legal challenges are likely to 
prove successful.  Law will thus be in a position to 
serve a critical role in provoking a frank conversation 
about how to replace the duplicitous politics of non-
entrée with a system predicated on the meaningful 
sharing of the burdens and responsibilities of refugee 
protection around the world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Wealthier states have a near-obsession with migration control, 
spending billions of dollars each year in the hope of securing their 
borders.1  Their objective is not, of course, to prevent the entry of all 
 
 1. In 2012, the United States spent $18 billion on border control.  Doris Meissner et 
al., Immigration Enforcement in the United States:  The Rise of a Formidable Machinery, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (2013).  Australia had a budget of AU$1.67 billion for the 2013–14 
operational year.  AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION SERVICE, BUDGET 2013–
14, at 101 (2013).  Combined spending for the twenty-eight E.U. member states is difficult 
to compile, but the European Union itself has allocated €1.82 billion between 2007 and 2013 
through its External Borders Fund.  DIRECTORATE-GENERAL HOME AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF 
STAKEHOLDER RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE OF EU FUNDING 
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outsiders.  To the contrary, developed states compete to attract those 
they believe likely to contribute to their well-being through trade, 
tourism, and the provision of labor.2  But the uninvited—including 
most unskilled and humanitarian migrants—are not welcome. 
Many persons seeking opportunity, safety, or some combina-
tion of the two will nonetheless feel compelled to vote with their feet, 
often traveling to precisely those more prosperous and secure states 
that resist their arrival.  The dissonance between their often powerful 
human needs and desires and generalized policies of migration con-
trol has spawned a never-ending race between border authorities and 
ever more inventive human smugglers:  for each loophole closed by 
officials, two new modes of unauthorized entry seem to emerge.3  
And even if this practical challenge to the developed world’s deter-
rent agenda could somehow be answered, there is a second obstacle 
to the ideal of watertight border control that is the focus of this Arti-
cle:  refugees (and some others) hold a trump card on migration con-
trol. 
Under international law, refugees are entitled to arrive of their 
own initiative, may not be penalized for unlawful arrival or presence, 
and must be protected for the duration of risk in their home country.4  
 
FOR HOME AFFAIRS POLICIES (2011). 
 2. See Ayelet Schachar, The Race for Talent:  Highly Skilled Migrants and 
Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (2006); STEPHEN CASTLES ET AL., 
THE AGE OF MIGRATION:  INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 
(5th ed. 2013); ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION:  THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES (1998). 
 3. Rey Koslowski, Economic Globalization, Human Smuggling, and Global 
Governance, in GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING:  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 60, 81 (David 
Kyle & Rey Koslowski eds., 2d ed. 2011); Ruben Hernandez-Leon, Conceptualizing the 
Migration Industry, in THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 24, 31–32 (Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & Ninna Nyberg 
Sørensen eds., 2013). 
 4. The duty of non-penalization is set by article 31 of the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees.  See generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 405–12 (2005).  The right to remain for the duration of risk follows 
from article 33’s duty of non-refoulement.  Cognate duties of non-refoulement arise under 
some other human rights instruments, including the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the 1984 Convention Against Torture, the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the 1989 American Convention on Human Rights, and the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights.  Id. at 368–69; THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, 
ACCESS TO ASYLUM:  INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF MIGRATION 
CONTROL 81–94 (2011); JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (2007).  Some scholars claim that the principle of non-
refoulement has become universally binding customary international law.  See Elihu 
Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Duty of Non-Refoulement, 
in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON 
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Indeed, refugee status is not “granted” by states at all, but is rather an 
international status that states are bound to recognize.5  Because a 
person is a refugee in consequence of his or her de facto circum-
stances rather than by virtue of any official validation of same, border 
officials will inevitably be confronted by persons legally entitled to 
the provisional benefit of the robust duty of non-refoulement as soon 
as they come under that state’s jurisdiction.6  The duty of non-
refoulement, codified in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, pro-
hibits states from exposing a refugee “in any manner whatsoever” to 
the risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason.7  It thus 
amounts to a de facto duty to admit the refugee at least until the refu-
gee claim is examined, since admission is normally the only means of 
avoiding the alternative, impermissible consequence of exposure to 
risk.8  This is, of course, a significant fetter on the permissible scope 
 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 87–177 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2001).  But see James 
Hathaway, Leveraging Asylum, 45 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 503 (arguing that the relatively 
consistent state practice required for a customary norm of non-refoulement to come into 
being does not in fact exist).  The required protection for the duration of risk need not occur 
in the country to which the refugee travels, but may be fairly shared among state parties.  See 
JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 30–49 (2d ed. 
2014). 
 5. See Directive 2011/95/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on Standards for the Qualification of Third- Country Nationals, 2011 O.J. (L 
337/9), preamble ¶ 21 (“The recognition of refugee status is a declaratory act”); see also 
Jószef Németh v. Minister of Justice, [2010] S.C.R. 56, ¶ 50 (Can.) (“Under the Refugee 
Convention, refugee status depends on the circumstances at the time the inquiry is made; it is 
not dependent on formal findings.”).  On the declaratory nature of refugee status, see 
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 158–59, 
and U.N. High Commissioner Comm. for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3 
(Dec. 2011). 
 6. Refugee Convention rights accrue incrementally, with states owing those asserting 
refugee status the provisional benefit of some rights.  See infra note 99. 
 7. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.  
See generally HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 4, at 279–370. 
 8. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 27.  That refugees are swept up in 
generalized deterrent efforts is patently clear, as has been reported in the case of persons 
returned by Italy to Libya.  See Hirsi Jamaa v. It., 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97.  Nor is it the case 
that those deterred and sent back to risky situations can be assumed not to be refugees at all.  
Ninety-four percent of asylum claims made in Australia by persons arriving by boat during 
the short-lived suspension of deterrent efforts from late 2008 until the end of 2010 were 
found to be genuine.  Verity Edwards, Boat Arrivals Almost All Get Visas, THE AUSTRALIAN 
(Feb. 25, 2011), www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/boat-arrivals-almost-all-get-
visas/story-fn7dlx76-1226011619093. 
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of migration control efforts.9 
Most confronting of all for destination states, the process of 
distinguishing a refugee entitled by law to enter and remain from an 
ordinary migrant subject to domestic discretionary rules is not 
straightforward, usually requiring a careful evaluation of the facts of 
an individual’s circumstances in relation to international legal stand-
ards.  If international law is not to be breached, the non-citizen who 
either claims asylum or who is recognizable as coming from a refu-
gee-producing situation must in practice be allowed to remain for the 
duration of the assessment of her status.10  The net result is that what 
would arguably be the most efficient means of implementing strin-
gent border controls against the uninvited—a universal policy of im-
mediate turnbacks of unauthorized non-citizens—is legally fore-
closed. 
In theory, the developed world could simply withdraw from 
the refugee law regime.  Whereas the refugee regime once served 
their interests fairly directly—enabling European states to avoid in-
stability in the wake of mass influxes of refugees across relatively 
porous borders during the early part of the twentieth century, and lat-
er giving an international imprimatur to the sheltering of the enemies 
of these states’ ideological adversaries after the Second World 
War11—such imperatives no longer exist.  There are, however, strong 
if more diffuse reasons for the developed world to remain a part of 
the refugee regime—for example, the domestic political value of be-
ing engaged in a process that systematizes humanitarian benevolence 
and an understandable reluctance to unpack a complex system of in-
ternational law that supports broader political and economic agendas 
of value to the industrialized world.12  But most fundamentally, 
 
 9. See Kazimierz Bem, The Coming of a “Blank Cheque”—Europe, the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, 16 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 609 (2004); James C. Hathaway, 
Can International Refugee Law be Made Relevant Again?, in RECONCEIVING 
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW xviii (1997). 
 10. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, 
at 158–59. 
 11. The reasons for the development of the refugee law system are discussed in James 
C. Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law:  1920–1950, 33 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 348 (1984).  See Atle Grahl-Madsen, The European Tradition of Asylum and 
the Development of Refugee Law, 3 J. PEACE RESEARCH 278 (1966); B. S. Chimni, The 
Geopolitics of Refugee Studies:  A View from the South, 11 J. REFUGEE STUD. 350 (1998); 
Matthew J. Gibney & Randall Hansen, Asylum Policy in the West:  Past Trends, Future 
Possibilities, U.N. University Discussion Paper No. 2003/68 (2003). 
 12. Alexander Betts & Jean-Francois Durieux, Convention Plus as a Norm-Setting 
Exercise, 20 J. REFUGEE STUD. 511 (2007); THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 50 YEARS ON:  
GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Susan Kneebone ed., 2003); Bem, supra note 9. 
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wealthier states realize the critical symbolic importance of appearing 
to remain engaged with the global refugee regime. 
Simply put, migratory and other pressures on the developed 
world are significantly attenuated by the efforts of the less developed 
states in which the overwhelming majority of the world’s refugees 
now live.13  If the global north were to withdraw entirely from refu-
gee law, there would be no politically viable basis upon which to in-
sist that poorer countries continue to shoulder their refugee law obli-
gations under the current system of atomized responsibility and 
fluctuating charity from the wealthier world.  And if less developed 
states were to follow suit and abandon refugee law in the context of 
continued instability in much of the global south—producing often 
massive refugee flows—the negative ramifications for both global 
security and economic well-being could be immense.14  Indeed, with 
fewer options to find protection close to home, the logic for refugees 
of seeking protection farther afield would surely increase—a scenario 
that wealthier countries do not wish even to contemplate. 
In short, while refugee law matters to developed states today 
for a variety of reasons,15 the most important is that it conscripts less 
developed countries to act in ways that provide a critical support to 
the developed world’s migration control project.  Critically, this more 
diffuse rationale for continued engagement with refugee law does not 
require the same level of hands-on, substantively meaningful imple-
mentation of refugee law by powerful states as was once the case.  
Developed countries today believe that their interests can be achieved 
by means of symbolic, rather than substantive, engagement with ref-
ugee law.  Whether the goal is to placate domestic humanitarian con-
stituencies, to avoid the unraveling of the international law regime, or 
to be seen standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the poorer states that 
actually make refugee protection work, optics are at the core of what 
matters.  Powerful states therefore see value in showing their com-
mitment to refugee law but would prefer—to the greatest extent pos-
sible—to avoid being subject to its practical strictures.  In particular, 
 
 13. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends 2012:  Displacement, 
The New 21st Century Challenge, 2 (2013), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
51bacb0f9.html.  
 14. Gibney & Hansen, supra note 11, at 16.  See generally Laura Barnett, Global 
Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime, 14 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
238 (2002); GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL REFUGEES:  PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (Aristide R. 
Zolberg & Peter M. Benda eds., 2001). 
 15. See James C. Hathaway, Why Refugee Law Still Matters, 8 MELB. J. INT’L L. 89, 
98–100 (2007); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, International Refugee Law and Refugee 
Policy:  The Case of Deterrence Policies, 27 J. REFUGEE STUD. 574, 579–83 (2014). 
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the developed world does not wish to be faced with the expectation 
that follows from the duty of non-refoulement, namely that refugees 
who manage to get to their jurisdiction are entitled to assert protec-
tion claims against them.16 
This seemingly schizophrenic posture has given rise to the 
politics of non-entrée.17  Whereas refugee law is predicated on the 
duty of non-refoulement, the politics of non-entrée is based on a 
commitment to ensuring that refugees shall not be allowed to arrive.  
Over the last three decades, even as powerful states routinely af-
firmed their commitment to refugee law,18 they have worked assidu-
ously to design and implement non-entrée policies that seek to keep 
most refugees from accessing their jurisdiction, and thus being in a 
position to assert their entitlement to the benefits of refugee law.  For 
many years, visa controls and carrier sanctions have been instituted 
to prevent even persons fleeing clearly refugee-producing countries 
from reaching the industrialized world by air.19  Airports, harbors, 
coastlines, and islands have been declared to be non-territory for pur-
poses of protection responsibilities.20  And states have resorted to 
maritime interception on the high seas in a desperate effort to take 
deterrent action in a place thought not to attract legal liability.21 
 
 16. Virginie Guiraudon & Gallya Lahav, A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty 
Debate:  The Case of Migration Control, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 163, 178 (2000); MIGRATION 
& THE EXTERNALITIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Sandra Lavenex & Emek Ucarer eds., 
2002); IN SEARCH OF EUROPE’S BORDERS (Kees Groenendijk et al. eds., 2002). 
 17. See generally James Hathaway, The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée, 91 
REFUGEES 40 (1992) (this term was first employed in this article). 
 18. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. 
HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (Jan. 16, 2002); Ministerial Intergovernmental Event on Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Dec. 7–8, 2011, Pledges 2011 (Dec. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ff55a319.pdf; Erika Feller, Asylum, Migration & Refugee Protection:  
Realities, Myths and the Promise of Things to Come, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 509, 523–24 
(2006). 
 19. See Frances Nicholson, Implementation of the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) 
Act 1987:  Privatising Immigration Functions at the Expense of International Obligations, 
46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 586 (1997); ANTONIO CRUZ, SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY:  CARRIERS’ 
LIABILITY IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NORTH AMERICA (1995). 
 20. See Tugba Basaran, Legal Borders in Europe:  The Waiting Zone, in A THREAT 
AGAINST EUROPE:  SECURITY, MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 63, 68 (Peter Burgess & Serge 
Gutwirth eds., 2011); Nicholson, supra note 19, at 588.  See generally Mark B. Salter, 
Governmentalities of an Airport:  Heterotopia and Confession, 1 INT’L POL. SOC. 49 (2007). 
 21. Stephen H. Legomsky, The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Programme, 18 
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 677, 681, 687 (2006); Susan Kneebone, The Pacific Plan:  The 
Provision of “Effective Protection?,” 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 696, 709–10 (2006); Andreas 
Fischer-Lescano, Tillman Löhr & Timo Tohidipur, Border Control at Sea:  Requirements 
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These non-entrée policies promised to insulate developed 
countries from de facto compliance with the duty of non-refoulement 
even as they left the duty itself intact.  Non-entrée allows wealthier 
states to insist upon the importance of refugee protection as a matter 
of international legal obligation, knowing that they will largely be 
spared its burdens.  It enables a pattern of minimalist engagement 
under which the formal commitment to refugee law can be pro-
claimed as a matter of principle without risk that the wealthier world 
will actually be compelled to live up to that regime’s burdens and re-
sponsibilities to any serious extent.  Non-entrée mechanisms have 
overall proved highly effective:  the developed world today protects 
less than 20% of the world’s refugees22 and is subject to no binding 
duty even to share the costs of protection in the less developed world, 
much less to resettle refugees to their own territories.  Whether 
measured in raw numbers, refugees per capita, or refugees per dollar 
of GDP,23 the brutal reality is that the overwhelming majority of to-
day’s refugees are in—and will remain in—many of the world’s 
poorest countries. 
The politics of non-entrée has thus facilitated a fundamentally 
duplicitous stance on the part of the developed world in which the 
value of refugee law is fervently proclaimed,24 even as its practical 
impact is largely avoided.  It is one thing to acknowledge that acci-
dents of geography mean that the less developed world is likely to 
continue to be the first port of call for the majority of the world’s ref-
ugees.  But it is another thing entirely actively to exacerbate that 
maldistribution of responsibility.  The duty to protect refugees—if it 
is in fact a general international legal obligation as states have said it 
is—should be implemented in good faith by all.25  In our view, it is 
high time to embark on a more honest discussion about the im-
portance of refugee protection as a shared responsibility, equitably 
implemented. 
Our goal here is to show that principles of international law 
have developed in ways that will facilitate a successful legal chal-
lenge to much of the non-entrée infrastructure that has been assem-
 
Under International Human Rights and Refugee Law, 21 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 256, 265–68 
(2009). 
 22. Volker Türk, Director of International Protection, U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Address to the 60th Meeting of the UNHCR Standing Committee 1, U.N. Doc. 
EC/65/SC/CRP.101 (July 1, 2014), available at http://www.unhcr.org/53c8d1449.html. 
 23. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends 2012, supra note 13. 
 24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
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bled by powerful states.  Specifically, contemporary understandings 
of jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and aiding or assisting—taken 
together—can and should be invoked in aid of dismantling the non-
entrée regime.  Such legal action will in turn force a more honest po-
litical conversation about how best to reconceive international refu-
gee protection as a substantively global responsibility. 
To this end, in Part I we describe the politics of non-entrée as 
it emerged and as it has evolved in practice.  Simple modes of non-
entrée—visa controls, carrier sanctions, and high seas interdiction—
have already proved vulnerable to both practical and legal challenge.  
They have thus largely given way to a range of new cooperation-
based policies, described in Part II, designed to conscript countries of 
origin and of transit to effect migration control on behalf of the de-
veloped world.  The overarching logic of this new generation of non-
entrée policies is to insulate wealthier countries from liability by en-
gaging the sovereignty of another country.  Because these non-entrée 
policies are implemented by, or under the jurisdiction of, the authori-
ties of other countries, sponsoring states believe that they can im-
munize themselves from legal responsibility for the deterrence of 
refugees and other persons entitled to international protection.  The 
net result is thus that deterrence is achieved even as liability is avoid-
ed. 
In truth, these new, cooperation-based non-entrée policies are 
rarely as “hands off” as developed states like to suggest.  This is be-
cause true sub-contracting of deterrence to other countries would 
mean that the sponsoring countries have less control, and hence re-
duced assurances of success.  To minimize the risk of failure, devel-
oped states ordinarily become more directly engaged.  We identify a 
seven-part typology of new generation non-entrée practices based on 
the degree of involvement by, or collaboration with, the sponsoring 
state or states:  reliance on diplomatic relations; the offering of finan-
cial incentives; the provision of equipment, machinery, or training; 
deployment of officials of the sponsoring state; joint or shared en-
forcement; assumption of a direct migration control role; and the es-
tablishment or assignment of international agencies to effect intercep-
tion. 
In Parts III, IV, and V, we examine in detail the tools of pub-
lic international law that we believe can be asserted to challenge this 
new generation of cooperation-based non-entrée policies. 
Part III looks to developments in the law of jurisdiction.  
While once anchored nearly exclusively in notions of territorial con-
trol, jurisdiction is now understood also to be established in some sit-
uations in which control is taken over persons outside of a state’s ter-
ritory, as well as in some circumstances in which a state exercises 
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public powers outside of its territory.  In our view, the territorial, per-
sonal, and public powers approaches to jurisdiction combine to force 
accountability for a significantly more extensive range of non-entrée 
actions than states believe. 
Part IV complements the discussion of jurisdiction by exam-
ining the important evolution of the law of shared responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts.  The “all or nothing” view under which 
only one state would be held liable where combined action resulted 
in a breach of international human rights law has given way to the 
possibility of shared responsibility—not just where jurisdiction is 
shared, but also where independent actions combine to produce a 
common wrong, or where states collaborate to act through a single 
entity. 
Part V moves beyond the issue of shared responsibility to ex-
amine the situations in which liability may result from a state aiding 
or assisting another country to breach international law.  At least 
where a state sponsoring non-entrée actions is aware that its contribu-
tions will lead to a breach of international law, liability may be estab-
lished even where that state neither has jurisdiction nor takes any di-
rect role in the commission of the wrongful act. 
In sum, the trio of developments in relation to jurisdiction, 
shared responsibility, and aiding or assisting means that states are 
mistaken in their assumption that international legal obligations—in 
particular, to respect the duty to avoid the refoulement of refugees—
are not enlivened when a state sponsors deterrent actions in some 
other country.  Especially when the sponsoring state or states engage 
in more activist roles, it is in our view likely that international law as 
it has evolved now affords the basis for holding them liable for 
breaching the rules of refugee law they seek to avoid.  Law can thus 
play a critical role in engendering a more forthright conversation 
among states about the means by which the burdens and responsibili-
ties of refugee protection should be shared. 
I.  TRADITIONAL NON-ENTRÉE:  CLEARLY DIMINISHED VIABILITY 
The practice of non-entrée—comprising efforts by powerful 
states to prevent refugees from ever reaching their jurisdiction at 
which point they become entitled to the benefit of the duty of non-
refoulement and other core rights set by the Refugee Convention—
has long been a feature of the refugee protection landscape. 
In perhaps the earliest incarnation of non-entrée, states sub-
contracted migration control to transportation companies.  From the 
early 1980s, the combination of visa controls (with a visa not being 
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offered for the purpose of seeking refugee protection) and carrier 
sanctions (under which those transporting persons without valid visas 
are subject to significant fines, and even to having aircraft or other 
vessels impounded) has compelled airlines and other transportation 
companies to effect migration control at the point of departure.26  In 
practice, both the employees of the carriers and the private security 
firms they engage have come to carry out increasingly elaborate doc-
ument and immigration checks, thereby denying refugees the right to 
travel and hence to advance their claims to protection.27 
A second favored form of non-entrée has been to establish so-
called “international zones”—particularly in airports—in which some 
or all of the legal obligations of the territorial state are declared not to 
apply.  Indeed, Australia purported to “excise” more than 3,500 is-
lands from its migration zone in 2001, declaring that it had no protec-
tion obligations to any refugee arriving in these parts of its national 
territory;28 this policy of excision has now been extended to the entire 
mainland of Australia.29  Claiming that the “international zone” is not 
under the jurisdiction of the country concerned—as President Putin 
declared when confronted with the presence of whistle-blower Ed-
ward Snowden in the “international zone” of Moscow’s Sheremetye-
vo Airport30—governments have asserted that they are at liberty to 
act without regard to refugee and other human rights obligations. 
A third traditional form of non-entrée is to effect deterrence 
on the high seas, an area that is in fact an international zone.  In the 
1990s, for example, U.S. Coast Guard ships were ordered to stop all 
persons in flight from the violence and persecution that accompanied 
the overthrow of the murderous Cedrás dictatorship in Haiti.31  In the 
years that followed, more than 35,000 Haitians were interdicted in in-
 
 26. CRUZ, supra note 19; Elspeth Guild, The Border Abroad—Visas and Border 
Controls, in IN SEARCH OF EUROPE’S BORDERS 87 (Kees Groenendijk et al. eds., 2002). 
 27. Nicholson, supra note 19; Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, 
Responsibility Beyond Borders:  State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by 
Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 70 MOD. L. REV. 598 (2007); Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Private Law Enforcement and Control, in THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS:  
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JENS VEDSTED-HANSEN 517 (Gammeltoft-Hansen et al. eds., 2013). 
 28. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Austl.); 
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 
(Austl.). 
 29. Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 
2013 (Austl.). 
 30. U.S. Whistleblower Snowden “Still in Moscow Airport,” BBC NEWS (June 26, 
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23053915. 
 31. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23, 133 (1992). 
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ternational waters and returned to Haiti without having had a proper 
assessment of their claims to be refugees.32  West African states were 
among those that followed the American lead, forcing vessels carry-
ing refugees away from their ports.33 
Over the past two decades, however, these traditional non-
entrée practices have been successfully challenged, both in practice 
and as a matter of law. 
First, while reliance on the combination of visa controls and 
carrier sanctions remains common, this approach may now be less 
capable of deterring refugees than was once the case.34  Refugees ar-
riving in the developed world today commonly rely on organized 
smuggling and other commercial modes of irregular migration.35  
Smugglers have responded to visa controls and carrier sanctions by 
adopting increasingly sophisticated technologies to produce travel 
documents that are difficult to detect.36  They also secure access for 
their clients by bribing border officials and regularly adapting travel 
routes to exploit new opportunities for entry.37  The vulnerability of 
the visa control and carrier sanction regime has thus given rise to an 
unending “cat and mouse game” in which border control must be 
constantly reinvented to respond to the schemes hatched by imagina-
tive smugglers motivated by extraordinary profits. 
Second, the notion that a state can delimit the geographical 
 
 32. Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Haiti and the United States During the 1980s and 1990s:  
Refugees, Immigration, and Foreign Policy, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 705 (1995); 
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 360. 
 33. Paul Kuruk, Asylum and the Non-Refoulement of Refugees:  The Case of the 
Missing Shipload of Liberian Refugees, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 313, 315 (1999). 
 34. See Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Introduction, in 
THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, 
supra note 3, at 8; STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION:  
INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 283–84 (1998). 
 35. See GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING:  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 2. 
 36. Marika McAdam & Sebastian Baumeister, Migrants Smuggling by Air, U.N. Office 
on Drugs and Crime Issue Paper, 8–9 (2010); Ulla D. Berg & Carla Tamagno, Migration 
Brokers and Document Fixers:  The Making of Migrant Subjects in Urban Peru, in THE 
MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, supra 
note 3, at 190. 
 37. See McAdam & Baumeister, supra note 36, at 13; Isabel Rosales Sandoval, Public 
Officials and the Migration Industry in Guatemala:  Greasing the Wheels of a Corrupt 
Machine, in THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION, supra note 3, at 215, 224; Jørgen Carling, Migration Control and Migrant 
Fatalities at the Spanish-African Borders, 41 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 316, 327 (2007); Ko-
Lin Chin, The Social Organization of Chinese Human Smuggling, in GLOBAL HUMAN 
SMUGGLING:  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 186. 
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scope of its territory for purposes of avoiding legal liability—for ex-
ample, by excision or the declaration of an international zone in an 
airport—has simply been rejected.  Responding to efforts by France 
to declare Orly Airport an “international zone” in which duties of 
protection do not apply, the European Court of Human Rights in 
Amuur concluded succinctly that “[d]espite its name, the internation-
al zone does not have extraterritorial status.”38  More recently, the 
High Court of Australia struck down a law providing that persons ar-
riving on an “excised” Australian island were precluded from access-
ing Australian courts and the usual procedures for assessment of ref-
ugee status.39  As these judgments make clear, both the nature of state 
territory at international law and the overarching duty to meet stand-
ards of fairness wherever there is an exercise of state power means 
that “international zones” are not capable of insulating a state from 
its legal obligations to protect refugees under its jurisdiction. 
Third, there is little support for the view that a state can deter 
refugees in the international space of the high seas without violating 
its duties of protection.  The outlier case is the 1993 decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Sale,40 in which the Court en-
gaged in highly formalist and decontextualized reasoning to find that 
a refugee cannot be “returned” by an asylum state to her home coun-
try if she has yet to arrive in the asylum state, and that a purely terri-
torial scope for the duty of non-refoulement is required by the lan-
guage of its national security exception.41  The Court purported to 
draw on the Convention’s travaux préparatoires to justify its reason-
ing,42 prompting the American representative to the specialist com-
mittee that drafted the Refugee Convention to reply that it would be 
“incredible that states that had agreed not to force any human being 
back into the hands of his or her oppressors intended to leave them-
selves—and each other—free to reach out beyond their territory to 
seize a refugee and to return him or her to the country from which he 
 
 38. Amuur v. France, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523, 609 (1996). 
 39. Plaintiff M61 & Plaintiff M69 v. Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 41 
(Austl.). 
 40. Sale v. Haitian Center Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
 41. Id. at 179 (“The full text of Article 33 reads as follows:  . . . ‘2. The benefit of the 
present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable 
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, 
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country.’ Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (emphasis added).”). 
 42. Id. at 194–95. 
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sought to escape.”43 
Happily, the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach has not found 
favor elsewhere.  It was rejected by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights,44 which adopted the contrary position advanced by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in its 
brief to the U.S. Supreme Court.45  The English Court of Appeal 
chose to treat Sale as “wrongly decided; it certainly offends one’s 
sense of fairness.”46  And in the recent case of Hirsi,47 a Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights determined unan-
imously that push-backs on the high seas were in breach of regional 
non-refoulement obligations.48  In a separate opinion, Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque pointedly observed that “the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation contradicts the literal and ordinary meaning of 
Article 33 of the U.N. Refugee Convention and departs from the 
common rules of treaty interpretation.”49 
In sum, the classic tools of non-entrée no longer provide de-
veloped states with an effective and legal means to avoid their obli-
gations under refugee law. 
II.  COOPERATION-BASED NON-ENTRÉE:  THE NEXT GENERATION 
With the viability of traditional forms of non-entrée compro-
mised, powerful states have embraced a new generation of deterrent 
regimes intended to overcome many of the weaknesses of the original 
generation of non-entrée practices.  The new approaches are predi-
cated on international cooperation, with deterrence occurring in the 
territory, or under the jurisdiction, of the home state or a transit coun-
try.  As a practical matter, new forms of non-entrée often include ac-
tion in states of origin or transit designed to disrupt migrant smug-
gling networks, thereby stymying travel toward the frontiers of 
 
 43. Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, 5 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. NEWSLETTER 1 
(1993). 
 44. See Haitian Center for Human Rights v. United States, Merits and Reparations, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 51/96, Case 10.675, 156–58 (1997). 
 45. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees in Support of Respondents, Sale v. Haitian Center Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) 
(No. 92-344). 
 46. R. (European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v. Immigration Officer at Prague 
Airport, [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 A.C. (H.L.) [34] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 47. Hirsi Jamaa v. It., 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97. 
 48. Id. ¶¶ 134–35. 
 49. Id. ¶ 66 (de Albuquerque, J., concurring). 
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developed states.  This geographical reorientation is also thought to 
be legally instrumental.  Even as international law has evolved to 
make clear that liability under the non-refoulement norm ensues for 
actions taken by a state at its own borders and in any other place un-
der its jurisdiction,50 it is assumed that actions undertaken under the 
jurisdiction of the authorities of other countries are legally risk-free.51  
With poorer states of origin and transit often willing for economic, 
political, and other reasons to serve as the gatekeepers to the devel-
oped world,52 wealthier countries believe that they can insulate them-
selves from liability for refugee deterrence by having such action 
take place under the sovereign authority of another country. 
One of the first such initiatives was undertaken by the United 
States in 1997.  Its Operation Global Reach provided for the ongoing 
presence of U.S. immigration officers in several Central American 
and Caribbean countries to work with local authorities to effect mi-
gration control operations.53  In 2001, Australia’s “Pacific Solution” 
saw that country woo the island state of Nauru with offers of free 
medical care, educational opportunities, and sports facilities in return 
for the warehousing in Nauru of migrants intercepted by Australia.54  
That deal was the genesis for outreach to other neighboring states, in-
cluding Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, intended to prevent boats 
carrying migrants from traveling towards Australia.55  And com-
 
 50. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 94–99; HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF 
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 160–73. 
 51. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 21, 126. 
 52. See Sandra Lavenex, Shifting Up and Out:  The Foreign Policy of European 
Immigration Control, 29 W. EUR. POL. 329, 330–33 (2006); Andrew Geddes, Migration as 
Foreign Policy?  The External Dimension of EU Action on Migration and Asylum, 2 
SWEDISH INST. EUR. POL’Y STUD. 1, 16 (2009); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Outsourcing 
Migration Management:  EU, Power, and the External Dimension of Asylum and 
Immigration Policy (Danish Institute for International Studies, Working Paper No. 2006/1, 
2006), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/ ?ots591 
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APPROACHES (Jan Niessen & Yongmi Schibel eds., 2004). 
 53. Jonathan M. Winer, Operation Global Reach News Conference, FEDERAL NEWS 
SERVICE (June 19, 1997); Koslowski, supra note 3, at 65. 
 54. See generally Tara Magner, The Less than “Pacific” Solution for Asylum Seekers 
in Australia, 16 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 53 (2004). 
 55. In July 2013, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia signed a bilateral agreement 
to process and resettle an uncapped number of asylum seekers in PNG, to be funded by 
Australia but administered by PNG.  As well as funding the entire arrangement, Australia 
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mencing in 2006, Spain and Italy struck deals with African countries 
to carry out maritime interdiction within their territorial waters.56  Ita-
ly went so far as to promise Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi $5 billion if 
he would set up radar detection facilities on his country’s shores and 
work with Italy to prevent the departure from Libya of unauthorized 
migrants.57 
Indeed, these bilateral and ad hoc arrangements have now 
spawned a series of more comprehensive arrangements.  Under the 
American-led Merida Initiative,58 the Bali Process co-chaired by 
Australia and Indonesia,59 and the European Union’s “external di-
mension,”60 developed states are crafting regional platforms that em-
bed asylum and migration questions into the mainstream of their for-
eign policy. 
There are myriad forms of cooperation-based non-entrée, 
ranging from simple diplomatic agreements to full-scale joint opera-
tions to effect migration control.  We observe seven main variants, 
which may be implemented separately or in tandem. 
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The first and most basic new form of non-entrée relies on dip-
lomatic relations.  Both sticks (such as withholding development as-
sistance) and carrots (including trade agreements, visa facilitation, 
and labor immigration quotas) may be provided to states of origin or 
transit willing to assist in the deterrence of outward migration.  The 
European Union has been especially active in promoting this ap-
proach, seeking to negotiate agreements with key Mediterranean and 
Eastern European states to combat “irregular” migration,61 including 
by the establishment or intensification of exit controls.62  States under 
consideration for accession to the European Union are moreover re-
quired to meet detailed migration control standards set by the Euro-
pean Commission as a condition to move forward in the process of 
securing actual membership in the Union.63 
A second new approach to non-entrée is to move beyond dip-
lomatic cooperation to provide partner states of origin and transit 
with direct financial incentives to take on migration control responsi-
bilities deemed of value.  Under the Mérida Initiative, for example, 
the United States has since 2008 appropriated some $2.1 billion to 
combat drug smuggling and improve border control in Mexico and 
Central America.64  Part of this funding has been used to purchase 
equipment, including helicopters and x-ray scanners,65 as well as to 
open new immigration control sites at the border between Mexico 
and Guatemala.66  Similarly, in 2003 Spain agreed to provide Moroc-
co with $390 million in aid and debt relief in return for Moroccan 
border control efforts.67  In 2009, Italy pledged $5 billion to Libya 
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over a twenty-year period in exchange for Libya agreeing to take 
back intercepted refugees and other migrants and to undertake patrols 
intended to prevent migration towards Europe.68 
Beyond offering financial incentives, a third variant of the 
new non-entrée is direct provision of equipment, machinery, and 
training to the authorities of the cooperating country.  Italy and other 
E.U. countries provided Libya with border control equipment, includ-
ing radars, night vision goggles, and patrol boats.69  European-funded 
security companies have provided document scanners and thermo-
imaging equipment to facilitate immigration control along the border 
between Russia and the Ukraine.70  Australia and Indonesia estab-
lished a joint center to improve border control and law enforcement 
capability in Jakarta in 2004.71  Australia also trains Sri Lankan naval 
officers and has gifted patrol boats and other border control equip-
ment to the country.72  In 2010, Mexican officials were invited to the 
United States for a ten-week training program on profiling techniques 
and the detection of false documents.73 
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A fourth form of collaborative deterrence is actually to deploy 
or second immigration officials of the destination country to work 
with authorities in the country of origin or transit.  For example, the 
United States maintains immigration officers in forty-eight foreign 
countries.74  Australia began posting Airline Liason Officers (ALOs) 
in Bangkok in 1990,75 and by 2013 had an ALO network of fifteen 
offices.76  In 2004, the European Union established a network of im-
migration officers drawn from member states to be posted at airports 
and border crossing points in key states of origin and transit.77  While 
both Australia and the European Union are at pains to emphasize that 
their immigration officers “do not carry out any tasks relating to the 
sovereignty of States,”78 in practice the “advice” or support of their 
officers is often decisive for decisions regarding onward travel.79 
Fifth, a program of joint or shared enforcement may be estab-
lished between the destination country and partner states of origin 
and/or transit.  U.S. immigration officers carried out joint operations 
with Mexican authorities,80 leading to some 74,000 apprehensions of 
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U.S.-bound immigrants between 1997 and 2001.81  Australian offi-
cials fund and work closely with their Sri Lankan counterparts to foil 
human smuggling efforts in the hope of deterring onward movement 
towards Australia.82  Since 2010, border guards of twenty-four Euro-
pean Union states have been deployed to the border between Greece 
and Turkey to prevent entry into Greece,83 and thus into the Union’s 
territory.  Spain has brought Senegalese and Mauritanian immigra-
tion officers onboard vessels engaged in interception of outbound 
migrants from the territorial waters of those states.84  Such “ship-
rider agreements” have also been entered into between Italy and Al-
bania,85 and between the United States and the Dominican Repub-
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CORP.) (July 21, 2011), available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-07-21/lynch---
twitter2c-sri-lanka2c-human-rights-and-australian-for/2803978; Ben Doherty, Sri Lanka to 
Make More Arrests:  More Sailors Linked to People Smuggling Ring, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD (Nov. 16, 2013), available at http://www.smh.com.au/national/sri-lanka-to-make-
more-arrests-more-sailors-linked-to-people-smuggling-ring-20131115-2xmdd.html; Tony 
Abbott Confirms Bay-Class Patrol Boats Gift to Sri Lanka to Combat People Smuggling, 
AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Nov. 17, 2013, 3:41 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-
17/abbott-confirms-sri-lanka-boats-deal/5097580.  In December 2012, the first Sri Lanka-
Australia Joint Working Group on People Smuggling and Transnational Crime was 
convened. See AUSTL. DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, ANN. REP. 2012–13, 10 
(2013), http://www.immi.gov.au/ 
about/reports/annual/2012-13/pdf/2012-13-diac-annual-report.pdf. 
 83. Establishing a Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid Border 78 Intervention 
Teams, Reg. (EC) No 863, (July 11, 2007); Sergio Carrera & Elspeth Guild, “Joint 
Operation RABIT 2010”—FRONTEX Assistance to Greece’s Border with Turkey:  
Revealing the Deficiencies of Europe’s Dublin Asylum System, CTR. EUR. POL’Y STUD. (Nov. 
22, 2010), http://aei.pitt.edu/15186/1/No_34_Carrera_&_Guild_on_RABIT_2010.pdf.   
 84. Longest Frontex-Coordinated Operation—HERA, the Canary Islands, FRONTEX 
(Dec. 19, 2006), http://frontex.europa.eu/news/longest-frontex-coordinated-operation-hera-
the-canary-islands-WpQlsc; Sergio Carrera, The E.U. Border Management Strategy:  
FRONTEX and the Challenges of Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands 21 (CEPS 
Working Document, No. 261, 2007), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/7385/1/1482.pdf; Jorrit 
J. Rijpma, Building Borders:  The Regulatory Framework for the Management of the 
External Border of the European Union 341–42 (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, European Univ. 
Inst.) (on file with authors); see DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION & THE LAW 
OF THE SEA 219 (2009). 
 85. Protocol Between Italy and Albania to Prevent Certain Illegal Acts and Render 
Humanitarian Assistance to Those Leaving Albania, GAZZETTA UFFICIALE DELLA 
REPUBBLICA ITALIANA NO. 163 (July 15, 1997); see GUILFOYLE, supra note 84, at 210. 
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lic.86 
In a sixth and still more intrusive form of non-entrée, the des-
tination country may actually take on a direct migration control role 
from within the territory of the cooperating state.  In 2001, the United 
Kingdom introduced a pre-clearance procedure at Prague Airport un-
der which British immigration officers stationed there had the author-
ity to grant or refuse leave to enter the United Kingdom before board-
ing.87  As was made clear in evidence considered by the House of 
Lords, a significant number of Roma seeking recognition of their ref-
ugee status were in fact deterred by this procedure.88  Agreements 
have also been signed to allow third country authorities onboard Eu-
ropean ships to carry out interceptions inside the territorial waters of 
such states as Libya, Mauritania, and Senegal.89  While relevant Eu-
ropean Union guidelines make express reference to the importance of 
respect for the duty of non-refoulement,90 interdicted persons have in 
practice often been returned without any assessment of their protec-
tion needs.91 
Finally, we are now seeing the emergence of a seventh ap-
proach to non-entrée in which international agencies are tasked by 
developed states with the responsibility to intercept refugees and oth-
er would-be migrants while they are still under the jurisdiction of 
countries of origin and of transit.  The European Union border agen-
cy, Frontex, has traditionally served as an umbrella organization to 
enable member states to carry out joint operations at the external 
borders of the Union and internationally.92  The agency has, however, 
 
 86. Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Maritime Migration Law Enforcement, 
U.S.-Dom. Rep., May 20, 2003, T.I.A.S No. 03-520; see GUILFOYLE, supra note 84, at 196. 
 87. See R. (European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v. Immigration Officer at 
Prague Airport, 2004 Court of Appeal, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 666, rev’d. on other grounds at 
[2004] UKHL 55; see also Andrew Brouwer & Judith Kumin, Interception and Asylum:  
When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide, 21 REFUGE 6, 11 (2003). 
 88. R. (European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v. Immigration Officer at Prague 
Airport, [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 A.C. 1 (H.L.) [34], ¶¶ 4, 92 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 89. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 126; GUILFOYLE, supra note 84, at 218; 
Rijpma, supra note 84. 
 90. Council Regulation 1168/2011, (EC), amending Council Regulation 2007/2004, 
(EC) arts. 1, 3(b), establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 2004 O.J. 
(L349/1). 
 91. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 126; GUILFOYLE, supra note 84, at 218. 
 92. Council Regulation 2007/2004, (EC), Establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union, 2004 O.J. (L349/1). 
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since been authorized to deploy its own immigration officers to third 
states, as well as to “initiate and carry out joint operations.”93  While 
the agency’s mandate requires it to respect duties under the Refugee 
Convention, in particular the duty of non-refoulement,94 it is doubtful 
that as a matter of international law the agency itself can be said to be 
truly bound by any international human rights instrument.95  As such, 
the shift in the Frontex mandate raises the specter of a legally unac-
countable entity deterring refugee and other migration in foreign 
space. 
To be clear, the seven variants of cooperation-based non-
entrée identified here are in no sense hermetically sealed options.  
For example, the Libyan-Italian interdiction scheme included not on-
ly financial incentives, but also comprised direct provision of border 
control equipment and joint enforcement operations in Libyan territo-
rial waters.96 
The truly pernicious nature of these new forms of non-entrée 
is especially clear when the cooperation is with countries not them-
selves legally bound to protect refugees.  Neither Libya nor Indone-
sia, for example, is a party to the Refugee Convention.97  And even 
when formally bound by refugee law, many of the favored partner 
states have no national procedure in place to assess refugee status nor 
the de facto capacity to or will to ensure respect for refugee rights.98  
 
 93. Council Regulation 1168/2011, supra note 90. 
 94. See id. art. 1(2). 
 95. International refugee law, and most general human rights law, is addressed 
exclusively to states.  Adjudicatory jurisdiction over international organizations thus cannot 
be established.  See Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); see also 
Saramati v. France, App. No. 78166/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).  The planned accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights may partly remedy this 
situation. 
 96. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Externalisation of European Migration Control 
and the Reach of International Refugee Law, in THE FIRST DECADE OF EU MIGRATION AND 
ASYLUM LAW 273, 293–95 (Paul Minderhoud & Elspeth Guild eds., 2011). 
 97. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, State Parties to the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html. 
 98. For example, while Libya is not a party to the U.N. Refugee Convention, it is 
bound by the 1969 Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against Torture; the non-
refoulement principle is moreover formally incorporated in its national law.  See Law of the 
General People’s Congress of 1991 (Law No. 20/1991), art. 2 (Libya).  Despite these 
commitments, Libya has yet to implement a functional asylum system and has a track record 
of abuse, detention, and forced return of refugees.  See AMNESTY INT’L, SEEKING SAFETY, 
FINDING FEAR:  REFUGEE, ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND MIGRANTS IN LIBYA AND MALTA 12 (2010); 
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As such, refugees trapped under the jurisdiction of these states have 
little or no ability to claim the rights to which they are in principle 
entitled by international law. 
The question to which we now turn is whether the assump-
tions upon which this new generation of cooperative non-entrée 
mechanisms is based are legally sound.  Specifically, we argue that 
the bedrock principle of public international law that state responsi-
bility follows from jurisdiction can no longer be narrowly under-
stood.  While primarily territorial in nature, jurisdiction today can al-
so be established in some situations in which control is taken over 
persons outside of a state’s territory, as well as in some circumstanc-
es in which a state exercises public powers outside of its territory.  
Nor is it the case that only one state can have jurisdiction in a given 
factual context.  To the contrary, principles of shared responsibility 
provide a critical means by which to hold sponsoring states account-
able for many forms of joint or collective conduct at the heart of the 
new generation of non-entrée.  And even where there is no jurisdic-
tion—particularized or shared—a more robust understanding of lia-
bility for aiding or assisting another country to breach international 
law is evolving that we believe has the potential to fill at least some 
of the accountability void that non-entrée policies seek to exploit.  
Taken together, developments in relation to jurisdiction, shared re-
sponsibility, and liability for aiding and assisting call into question 
the legality of many, if not all, of the new, international cooperation-
based deterrent regimes. 
III.  JURISDICTION IN EVOLUTION 
Unlike most other human rights instruments, the rights con-
tained in the 1951 Refugee Convention are not granted en bloc, but 
rather incrementally, requiring states gradually to extend more gen-
erous rights as the degree of attachment between the refugee and host 
state increases.99  While the majority of rights are explicitly reserved 
for refugees who are physically present in the territory or who have 
some higher level of attachment to the host state, a few core rights—
including the duty of non-refoulement—are intentionally said to ap-
 
Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around, supra note 57, at 48.  
 99. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, 
at 161–63.  The notion of “levels of attachment” was adopted by the U.K. Supreme Court in 
R. (ST (Eritrea)) v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept., [2012] UKSC 12, ¶¶ 21–23 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
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ply without territorial or other qualification.100  The plain language of 
the Convention thus makes clear that this critical group of baseline 
rights is not acquired only when a refugee reaches a state party’s ter-
ritory101 —this being the requirement to qualify for rights that are ac-
quired at the second level of attachment (“in” or “within” a contract-
ing state’s territory).  While at no time did the drafters suggest that 
state parties were responsible to effectuate refugee rights in the world 
at large, neither did they purport to exempt states that choose to act 
beyond their territory from responsibility for the consequences of 
such actions.  In view of this ambiguity—plain language makes clear 
that some refugee rights are not limited to refugees physically present 
in a state party’s territory, yet neither are state parties compelled by 
the treaty to implement rights in the world at large—rules of treaty 
interpretation compel the adoption of an understanding of the first, 
ambiguously-framed level of attachment that is in line with the con-
text, object, and purpose of the Refugee Convention.102 
These considerations lead us to seek guidance in the approach 
taken by international human rights law—expressly part of the Con-
vention’s context by virtue of its Preamble,103 and an appropriate 
touchstone in view of the holdings of leading courts that the object 
and purpose of refugee law is to provide for the surrogate or substi-
tute protection of human rights.104  Under international human rights 
 
 100. In addition to article 33’s protection against refoulement, these rights include non-
discrimination (article 3), property (article 13), access to the courts (article 16(1)), the right 
to benefit from rationing schemes (article 20), education (article 22), fiscal equality (article 
29), and the ability to apply for a durable status (article 34).  HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF 
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 160–71. 
 101. As noted by the House of Lords, “the starting point of the construction exercise 
must be the text of the Convention itself . . . because it expresses what the parties to it have 
agreed.”  Januzi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2006] UKHL 5, [2006] 2 
A.C. 426 (per Lord Bingham); see Saadi v. U.K., 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 17, ¶¶ 61–62 (2008); 
Golder v. U.K., 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 29 (1975). 
 102. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, art. 33(3).  As noted 
by the International Court of Justice, “interpretation cannot remain unaffected by subsequent 
development of law . . . an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within 
the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.”  
Namibia (South West Africa) Case, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 31 (June 21). 
 103. See, e.g., Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, ¶ 72 (Can.); HATHAWAY, THE 
RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 64. 
 104. This understanding has been widely adopted:  See, e.g., Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, [2002] 210 CLR 1 (Austl.); Ward v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 733 (Can.); Msengi v. Minister for Justice, Equality, Law 
Reform, [2006] I.E.H.C. 241 (H. Ct.) (Ir.); Re MN, Appeal No. 2039/93, ¶¶ 38–40 (N.Z. 
R.S.A.A., 1996); Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2000] UKHL 37, 
[2001] 1 A.C. 489, 495 (appeal taken from Eng.).  For a more complete list of the many 
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law, the usual baseline position105 is that rights are owed to anyone 
“within” or “subject to” a state’s jurisdiction.106  Adopting the same 
approach for acquisition of the most basic refugee rights (that is, 
those that are not qualified by references to physical presence or oth-
erwise)—including, of course, the duty of non-refoulement—is thus 
contextually logical as well as purposively sound, a fact recognized 
by soft law107 and confirmed by dominant state practice.108 
In one of the clearest statements of the meaning of jurisdic-
tion in international human rights law, the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee determined that the obligation under the Civil and Politi-
cal Covenant to respect rights “within [a state’s] territory and . . . 
subject to [its] jurisdiction . . . means . . . a [state] must respect and 
ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the 
power or effective control of the [state], even if not situated within 
 
appellate courts that have embraced this understanding, see generally HATHAWAY & FOSTER, 
supra note 4, at 185 n.18. 
 105. The four Geneva Conventions are exceptional, expressly obligating state parties “to 
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”  Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (emphasis added). 
 106. See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 2 § 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 22 § 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112; American Convention on Human 
Rights:  “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” art. 1 § 1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2 § 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171; European Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Sep. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; see also 
GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 81−93; HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 64−66. 
 107. See, e.g., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee 
Conclusions:  Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures:  Conclusion 
No. 97 (LIV), ¶ a (Oct. 10, 2003), http://www.unhcr.org/3f93b2894.html; United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee Conclusions:  General Conclusion 
on International Protection:  Conclusion No. 74 (XLV), ¶ g ( Oct. 7, 1994), http://www.un 
hcr.org/3ae68c6a4.html. 
 108. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 72−81; HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF 
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 68−74.  The U.S. government 
represents a notable exception to this position and maintains that article 33 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention applies strictly territorially.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Observations of 
the United States on the Advisory Opinion of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees on 
the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol (Dec. 28, 2007), available at 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/2007/112631.htm; see also Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
Extraterritorial Migration Control and the Reach of Human Rights, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW & MIGRATION 113, 116  
n. 14 (Vincent Chetail & Céline Bauloz eds., 2014) . 
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the territory of the [state].”109  This approach was affirmed as accu-
rate by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the seminal Israeli 
Wall decision, which insisted that “the drafters of the Covenant did 
not intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they 
exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory.”110 
Some confusion was, however, sewn by the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Bankovic.111  Invoking general 
principles of international law112 to interpret the scope of jurisdiction 
for purposes of entitlement to human rights protection, the Court de-
termined that extensions beyond territorial jurisdiction113 are “excep-
tional and requir[e] special justification in the particular circumstanc-
es of each case.”114  Finding no such special justification to exist in 
regard to the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO states, the Court 
ruled that the states conducting the bombing had no jurisdiction over 
the civilians killed, and thus did not breach the European Convention 
despite effecting their deaths. 
In recent years, however, the open-ended language about the 
meaning of jurisdiction adopted in the Bankovic decision has been 
built upon in a way that brings European regional human rights law 
to a position on the meaning of jurisdiction that is substantially in 
line with that adopted by the U.N. Human Rights Committee and af-
firmed by the ICJ.  As the critical 2011 ruling in Al-Skeini makes 
 
 109. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶ 10 (Mar. 29, 2004). 
 110. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 109 (July 9); see Armed Activities of the 
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19) 
(finding that international human rights law is “applicable ‘in respect of acts done by a State 
in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory’”) (quoting Legal Consequences, 
2004 I.C.J. at ¶ 107−13). 
 111. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. 
 112. Id. ¶ 59.  As a matter of public international law, a state’s jurisdiction normally 
denotes its entitlement to prescribe and enforce its domestic laws, and the notion of 
jurisdiction has therefore—at least in regard to enforcement—traditionally been linked to 
state territory.  Vaughan Lowe & Christopher Staker, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
335, 338 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2nd ed. 2006); Bruno Simma & Andreas Th. Müller, 
Exercise and Limits of Jurisdiction, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
134, 135 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012). 
 113. As pointed out by the ICJ, “while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it 
may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory.”  Legal Consequences, 2004 
I.C.J., ¶ 109. 
 114. Bankovic, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 61.  This has since been reiterated in several 
judgments.  See, e.g., Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶ 131 (2011). 
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clear, while the concept of jurisdiction remains in evolution, states 
today exercise human rights jurisdiction beyond their territory in an 
increasing number of situations.115 
The first such situation is where a state exercises effective 
control over some or all of the territory of another country, most no-
tably by way of military occupation.116  The jurisdictional obligations 
of the occupying state stem from de facto control alone117—
lawfulness is not required.118  What matters is that the state is ad-
judged to exercise overall control of a defined territory for some pe-
riod of time, and to the exclusion of the territorial state.119  For ex-
ample, the ICJ held in its Wall opinion that Israel’s human rights 
obligations apply to “all conduct by the State party’s authorities or 
agents in [the occupied] territories that affect the enjoyment of rights 
. . . and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the 
principles of public international law.”120  Much the same result was 
reached by the European Court of Human Rights in Cyprus v. Tur-
key, finding that responsibility followed not simply because relevant 
actions had been taken by government agents, but more generally 
from the fact of a relevant act or omission having taken place within 
an area of effective control.121 
This first, control-based extension of the notion of the tradi-
tional territorial view of jurisdiction is likely of little immediate value 
in contesting the new generation of cooperation-based non-entrée 
 
 115. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 132. 
 116. Bankovic, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 71.  For other cases involving effective control 
over territory, see Legal Consequences, 2004 I.C.J., ¶¶ 102–14; Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-
VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216; Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. (1999); Salas v. United States, Case No. 
10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 31/93, OEA/Ser.L/V.85, doc. 9 rev. (1993). 
 117. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 35 
(2009). 
 118. As is also the case under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the lawfulness of such 
military operations is in principle irrelevant to the obligations imposed on the occupying 
power.  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, ¶ 
73 (noting that “responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence 
of military action—whether lawful or unlawful—it exercises effective control of an area 
outside its national territory”). 
 119. DINSTEIN, supra note 117, at 38. 
 120. Legal Consequences, 2004 I.C.J., ¶ 110 (quoting U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:  Israel. 
05/08/2003, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 5, 2003)). 
 121. Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 77. 
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practices.  Not only has the case law thus far focused only on obliga-
tions arising from military occupation, but to date there is no instance 
of non-entrée having been implemented by way of the transfer of du-
rable and exclusive control over territory.122  In contrast, we see real 
potential in two other developments in the law of jurisdiction:  juris-
diction based on the exercise of authority over individuals, for exam-
ple by way of arrest or detention; and jurisdiction established by the 
exercise abroad of public powers abroad as a matter of treaty or other 
agreement. 
A. Jurisdiction Based on Authority over Individuals 
Short of exercising territorial control, “a State may also be 
held accountable for violation of . . . rights and freedoms of persons 
who are in the territory of another State but who are found to be un-
der the former State’s authority and control through its agents operat-
ing—whether lawfully or unlawfully—in the latter State.”123  States 
have, for example, been found to have jurisdiction over individuals 
within their embassy or consulate, or who are onboard craft or ves-
sels registered in their country, or which are flying their flag.124  It is 
also acknowledged that a state has jurisdiction over individuals held 
on its military bases, detention centers, or other closed facilities con-
trolled by the extraterritorially acting state.125 
 
 122. The closest approximation may be the agreement under which the United Kingdom 
is allowed to enforce its national immigration law within designated areas of the French 
ports of Dunkirk, Boulogne, and Calais.  At the international level, the juxtaposed control 
scheme is provided for by the Touquet treaty, which was signed on February 4, 2003 and 
was given domestic effect by the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 
(Juxtaposed Controls) Order 2003.  Similar control arrangements have been made to give 
access to United Kingdom immigration officers to perform migration control at Eurostar 
stations in France and Belgium.  See The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
(Juxtaposed Controls), 2003, Order 2003 No. 2818 (U.K.); Treaty Concerning the 
Implementation of Frontier Controls at the Sea Ports of Both Countries on the Channel and 
North Sea, Le Touquet, U.K.-Fr., Feb. 4, 2003, 42 U.N.T.S. 2290. 
 123. Issa v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 567, ¶ 71 (2005). 
 124. Medvedyev v. France, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, ¶ 65; Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-
XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 73.  See generally M. v. Denmark, App. No. 17392/90, Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1992); W. v. Ireland, App. No. 9360/81, 32 Eur. Comm’n. H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 211, 215 (1983); X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7547/76, Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 73 (1977); X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 1611/62, Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158, 168 (1965); Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 40, ¶ 8.2; Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, ¶ 19. 
 125. See Al-Saadoon, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 19; see also Al-Skeini v. Sec’y of State for 
Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 A.C. 153, ¶ 25 (appeal taken from Eng.); Hess v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 6231/73, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 72 (1975). 
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Such findings are, at one level, unsurprising:  they simply 
mirror the traditional approach in public international law to the 
scope of enforcement jurisdiction.  But the European Court of Hu-
man Rights has gone farther, finding human rights jurisdiction to be 
established even by the simple act of boarding a migrant vessel, the 
emphasis being placed in such cases on the de facto control exercised 
over the individuals concerned.126  This focus on the exercise of con-
trol as a means of establishing human rights jurisdiction can perhaps 
be seen most clearly in cases involving state agents forcibly appre-
hending and transporting an individual to their state’s territory.127  
Courts have emphasized that the logic of finding jurisdiction in such 
a situation is the importance of stymying the evasion of obligations, 
since it would be “unconscionable . . . to permit a State party to per-
petrate violations of [human rights] in the territory of another State, 
which violations it could not perpetrate within its own territory.”128  
Thus, as observed in Al-Skeini, jurisdiction may arise solely from 
“the exercise of physical power and control over the person in ques-
tion.”129 
Applying this understanding of jurisdiction to the context of 
non-entrée policies, jurisdiction is established when refugees are in-
tercepted and their movements controlled by state agents acting out-
side their country.130  A Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled in Hirsi that Italy had jurisdiction over migrants 
turned back on the high seas under the auspices of its cooperation 
agreement with Libya and that characterizing such interception as a 
 
 126. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶ 136 (2011); Medvedyev v. 
France, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, ¶ 65. 
 127. See, e.g., Ramirez v. France, App. No. 28780/95, 86-B Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 155, 162 (1996); Reinette v. France, App. No. 14009/88, 63 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 189, ¶ 2 (1989); Freda v. Italy, App. No. 8916/80, 21 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
250, 256 (1980); Öcalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 282, ¶ 93; Stocke v. Germany, 53 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 166, 199 (1991); Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Human Rights 
Committee, No. 56/1979, at 92, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/56_1979.htm; Burgos v. Uruguay, Human 
Rights Committee, No. R.12/52, at 176, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) (1981), available 
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session36/12-52.htm. 
 128. Burgos, No. R.12/52, ¶ 12.3; see also Issa, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 71. 
 129. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 136.  Most cases to date have involved situations of 
full physical custody by way of arrest or kidnapping.  In Al-Saadoon, for example, the Court 
emphasized “the total and exclusive” control exercised by the United Kingdom over the 
military bases in Iraq.  Al-Saadoon, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 88.  
 130. See, e.g., Ramirez, App. No. 28780/95, at 162; Öcalan, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.; 
Celiberti de Casariego, No. 56/1979; Burgos, No. R.12/52.  
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“rescue operation[] on the high seas”131 was legally irrelevant: 
The Court observes that in the instant case the events 
took place entirely on board ships of the Italian armed 
forces, the crews of which were composed exclusively 
of Italian military personnel.  In the Court’s opinion, 
in the period between boarding the ships of the Italian 
armed forces and being handed over to the Libyan au-
thorities, the applicants were under the continuous and 
exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian au-
thorities.  Speculation as to the nature and purpose of 
the intervention of the Italian ships on the high seas 
would not lead the Court to any other conclusion.132 
Given the lack of protection for refugees in Libya and the risk 
of persecution in the applicants’ countries of origin (Eritrea and So-
malia), the Court found Italy in breach of its human rights obliga-
tions, including the duty of non-refoulement.133 
Indeed, jurisdiction may continue where interception leads to 
the transfer of refugee claimants to a detention or similar facility lo-
cated outside the territory of the intercepting state.134  In the Marine I 
case,135 the Committee Against Torture was called upon to consider 
Spain’s human rights liability stemming from the rescue of some 369 
Asians and Africans in waters off the West African coast.  After 
boarding the Marine I to provide emergency health care, Spanish au-
thorities towed the vessel to the Mauritanian port of Nouadhibou 
where the passengers were disembarked and placed at a former fish-
ing plant under Spanish authority.  Most were repatriated, though 
twenty-three persons who resisted repatriation remained at the fishing 
plant guarded by Spanish security forces for five months under con-
ditions alleged to be rights-violative.136  The Committee Against Tor-
ture concluded that Spain exercised jurisdiction both during the inter-
ception and throughout the detention in Mauritania, noting that: 
[J]urisdiction must also include situations where a 
State party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or 
de jure control over persons in detention . . . .  In the 
 
 131. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, ¶ 79. 
 132. Id. ¶ 81. 
 133. Id. ¶¶ 122−38, 146−58, 183−86. 
 134. Al-Saadoon, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 88. 
 135. J.H.A. v. Spain, Judgments U.N. Committee Against Torture, No. 323/2007, U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007 (2008). 
 136. Ten of the twenty-three were eventually granted access to Spain and Portugal and 
the final thirteen returned to Pakistan.  Id. 
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present case, . . . the State party maintained control 
over the persons on board the Marine I from the time 
the vessel was rescued and throughout the identifica-
tion and repatriation process that took place at Nouad-
hibou.  In particular, the State party exercised, by vir-
tue of a diplomatic agreement concluded with 
Mauritania, constant de facto control over the alleged 
victims during their detention in Nouadhibou.  Conse-
quently, the Committee considers that the alleged vic-
tims are subject to Spanish jurisdiction insofar as the 
complaint that forms the subject of the present com-
munication is concerned.137 
Beyond its value as a clear affirmation that an intercepting 
state retains jurisdiction even when its control over persons is exer-
cised on the territory of another country, the Marine I case makes a 
more general point that jurisdiction can be established under the con-
trol or authority principle where detention is effected on an indirect 
basis: 
[T]he jurisdiction of a State party refers to any territo-
ry in which it exercises, directly or indirectly, in 
whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective control, 
in accordance with international law.  In particular . . . 
such jurisdiction must also include situations where a 
State party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or 
de jure control over persons in detention.138 
It follows that a country exercises jurisdiction over refugees 
when its vessels block or “escort” a ship carrying refugees, since 
those refugees are indirectly detained (that is, “confine[d] within a 
narrowly bounded or restricted location”).139  At least where the 
blocking or escorting is more than momentary—as will be the case 
for reasons of efficacy in most non-entrée scenarios—there is little 
doubt that control over the human beings onboard is as real in such 
cases as it is when freedom of movement is constrained by the act of 
 
 137. Id. ¶ 8.2.  However, the case was declared inadmissible because the complainant 
was not expressly authorized to act on behalf of the victims. 
 138. Id. 
 139. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR’s Revised Guidelines on the Ap-
plicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers, Guideline 1 
(Feb. 26, 1999), available at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain? 
docid=3c2b3f844.  These guidelines were replaced by U.N. High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, Detention Guidelines:  Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating 
to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=503489533b8. 
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actually boarding.140  Indeed, in Xhavara, the European Court of 
Human Rights found human rights jurisdiction to exist when an Ital-
ian navy ship seeking to deter migrants on the high seas collided with 
another vessel, leading to fifty-eight deaths141—a poignant example 
of the salience of the Committee Against Torture’s insistence that 
“indirect” control may be just as effective as direct control.142 
In sum, it is clear that territorial control—while sufficient—is 
no longer required to establish human rights jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction 
also exists where refugees are intercepted and their movements con-
trolled by state agents acting outside of their country’s territory, in-
cluding when those agents continue to exercise control over them in a 
detention facility in another country.  There is also human rights ju-
risdiction where extraterritorial control is indirect, as in the cases of 
blockades and the forcible escort of vessels carrying asylum seekers 
on the high seas.  In each of these ways, the modern understanding of 
human rights jurisdiction is clearly a powerful means to challenge the 
common assumption underlying non-entrée policies that core refugee 
protection responsibilities apply rarely, if ever, outside their own ter-
ritory. 
B.  Exercise of Public Powers 
Jurisdiction will most readily be established on the basis of ei-
ther territorial or personal control.  As explained in the preceding 
subsection, the personal control jurisprudence is an especially valua-
ble means of challenging some critical forms of cooperation-based 
non-entrée under which the role of the extraterritorial state in inter-
diction or enforcement can be characterized as amounting to de facto 
control over the refugees themselves.  But what if the degree of con-
trol exercised by the sponsoring state falls short of what is required to 
 
 140. Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights determined that the 
shooting down of an aircraft in international airspace near Cuba’s borders was sufficient to 
trigger Cuba’s human rights jurisdiction.  Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 86/99, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev.  ¶ 25 (1997). 
 141. See Xhavara v. Italy, App. No. 39473/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001). 
 142. Indeed, a number of recent cases suggest that human rights jurisdiction may be 
established even when there is no evidence of ongoing direct or indirect control.  Contrary to 
the view taken in Bankovic, recent decisions suggest that human rights jurisdiction may be 
established on the basis of the effects of rights-violative conduct lacking any element of 
durable control.  Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 73.  See, e.g., Andreou 
v. Turkey, App. No. 45653/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Solomou v. Turkey, App. No. 
36832/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); Pad v. Turkey, App. No. 60167/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); 
Isaak v. Turkey, App. No. 44587/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006). 
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establish jurisdiction under the personal control approach?  In partic-
ular, what if non-entrée is implemented by proxy, for example where 
the sponsoring state deploys officials to work with authorities in a 
country of origin or transit to advise them on how best to block refu-
gee departures? 
Recent case law suggests that in addition to the territorial and 
personal control bases for establishing jurisdiction, states may also be 
found to have jurisdiction where they exercise public powers abroad.  
In Al-Skeini, the key question was whether the United Kingdom had 
jurisdiction over civilians killed in the course of security operations 
by British soldiers in Basrah.143  Rather than determining the issue of 
responsibility simply by reference to either territorial or personal 
control, the European Court of Human Rights instead observed that: 
[T]he Court has recognised the exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State when, 
through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the 
Government of that territory, it exercises all or some 
of the public powers normally to be exercised by that 
Government . . . .  Thus where, in accordance with 
custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of the 
Contracting State carry out executive or judicial func-
tions on the territory of another State, the Contracting 
State may be responsible for breaches of [international 
law] thereby incurred, as long as the acts in question 
are attributable to it rather than to the territorial 
State.144 
In other words, where states are entitled to exercise public powers 
abroad, jurisdiction for human rights purposes will follow under cer-
tain circumstances.145  Three requirements must be met. 
First, the legal authority of the extraterritorial state to act must 
be established in “accordance with custom, treaty or other agree-
ment.”146  Excluded therefore are situations such as an unlawful inva-
sion in which public powers are effectively usurped by the foreign 
state.  This constraint is, however, unlikely to be of any real moment 
in relation to cooperation-based non-entrée policies, routinely im-
plemented through interstate arrangements.  Because some “other 
 
 143. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶¶ 102, 130–50 (2011). 
 144. Id. ¶ 135. 
 145. The European Court of Human Rights has recently affirmed the “public powers” 
approach to jurisdiction as adumbrated in Al-Skeini.  Jaloud v. Netherlands, 2014 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 1292, ¶ 145. 
 146. Id. ¶ 139 (quoting Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 135). 
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agreement” falling short of custom or treaty suffices, even relatively 
informal agreements—memoranda of understanding, an exchange of 
letters—are enough to show the requisite consent.  Indeed, even the 
absence of an effective government in the territorial state with which 
agreement may be reached is not necessarily fatal, since the facts of 
Al-Skeini itself suggest that the legal basis for the exercise of public 
powers may be derived from international legal authorization, for ex-
ample in the form of a U.N. resolution.147 
Second, the activities undertaken must be fairly characterized 
as a “public power[] normally to be exercised by that Govern-
ment.”148  The notion of public power is not well-defined in interna-
tional law, and may thus give rise to disagreement in some cases.  
But since the court in Al-Skeini made clear that “public powers” in-
clude not just security or civil administration, but also executive and 
judicial functions,149 there can be little doubt that the exercise of mi-
gration control—being a core law enforcement task and exclusive 
sovereign prerogative—constitutes a public power.150 
Third, the breach of human rights resulting from the exercise 
of public powers must be attributable to the extraterritorially acting 
state, rather than to the territorial state.151  The real link required is, of 
course, readily established where the sponsoring state has actually 
deployed officers or vessels engaged directly in enforcement.  But 
under general principles of international law, conduct is also attribut-
able to a sponsoring state where private actors or third state authori-
ties act under the direction and control of the sponsoring state,152 or 
 
 147. Id. ¶ 144. 
 148. Id. ¶ 139 (quoting Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 135). 
 149. Id. ¶¶ 139, 143−48 (quoting Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 130−39). 
 150. As Emmerich de Vattel notes in The Law of Nations, every sovereign nation retains 
the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the 
entrance of foreigners within its dominions or to admit them only in such cases or upon such 
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.  EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. 2, 
§§ 94, 100 (1883).  This is fully consistent with current state practice.  See, e.g., Sale v. 
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 199 (1993); R. (European Roma Rights Centre and 
Others) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 A.C. 1, ¶ 45 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
 151. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 135. 
 152. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Int’l Law Comm’n, Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 8, 17, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 
10 (2001).  For a general discussion of the relevant test for attributing non-state and third 
state conduct, see JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY:  THE GENERAL PART 126−32, 
146−61 (2013). 
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where effective control is retained over officials otherwise carrying 
out migration control as part of an international organization.153 
Given the consonance between the three requirements for ju-
risdiction based on the exercise of public powers and the nature of 
many cooperation-based non-entrée practices, this emerging line of 
jurisprudence is an important addition to the more established ap-
proaches grounded in territorial or personal control.  Even where 
there is no territorial or personal control, the fact that the sponsoring 
state can be said to exercise migration control functions beyond its 
borders—an increasingly common phenomenon—will often suffice 
to establish jurisdiction despite formal assertions to the contrary. 
Under E.U. law, for example, the RABIT (“rapid border in-
tervention teams”) Regulation posits that any responsibility stem-
ming from joint operations rests solely with the Member State host-
ing the operation.154  Yet in substance, the Regulation undoubtedly 
establishes a clear entitlement of officials of E.U. states seconded to 
Frontex to exercise public powers in that they not only work in their 
national uniforms, but “shall have the capacity to perform all tasks 
and exercise all powers for border checks or border surveillance” in 
line with the Schengen Borders Code.155  Although formally required 
to patrol only in the company of an officer of the host country and to 
act only on the instructions of the host state, Frontex officers de-
ployed to Greece have, in practice, independently carried out patrols 
and intercepted and interviewed refugees and other migrants.156  De-
spite Greece’s theoretical responsibility to decide the issue of return 
or admission to an asylum procedure, there is little doubt that in prac-
tice the dysfunctional Greek asylum system—determined by both the 
European Court of Human Rights and European Court of Justice to 
fall below even minimal international standards of efficacy157—relies 
 
 153. See Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092, ¶ 80; Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, art. 7, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/10; GAOR, 63th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2011); CRAWFORD, supra note 152 at 
422−34. 
 154. Council Regulation 863/2007, Establishing a Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid 
Border Intervention Teams, art. 10, 2007 O.J. (L 199/30) (EC). 
 155. Id. art. 6 § 1. 
 156. Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty Hands:  Frontex Involvement in Ill-
Treatment of Migrant Detainees in Greece 38−46 (2011), http://www.hrw.org/sites/ 
default/files/reports/greece0911webwcover_0.pdf. 
 157. See M.S.S. v. Belgium, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R 108; Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-
493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t & M.E. v. Refugee Applications Comm’r, 
2011 E.C.R I-13991, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=117187&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&%20mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=43817; see also Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty Hands, supra note 156, at 
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significantly on the efforts of officials from other E.U. states.  In the-
se circumstances, the public powers approach to jurisdiction affords a 
sound basis to argue that these other states may exercise jurisdiction 
by their deterrent actions, and should therefore be held accountable 
for any breach of refugee or other international law following from 
that exercise of public powers. 
To be clear, we do not argue that liability for a breach of hu-
man rights law ought to hinge exclusively on the permissibility of a 
state’s actions.158  But it is important not to conflate this argument 
with the view that the exercise of public powers should be seen as an 
additional basis to find jurisdiction (beyond territory and personal 
authority).  Our argument is in no way that human rights responsibil-
ity should be limited by formal notions of sovereignty, but rather that 
legal entitlement to act extraterritorially as a matter of public interna-
tional law fairly defines a (not “the”) circumstance in which jurisdic-
tion exists, and that accountability for human rights violations is en-
hanced by acknowledging this additional basis to hold states 
responsible for breach of relevant norms. 
The continued alignment of human rights law and public in-
 
38−46.  In June 2014, the Committee of Ministers decided to continue supervision of Greece 
based on a finding that the asylum system is still not fully compliant with the European 
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on the degree of de facto control.  See e.g., Burgos v. Uruguay, Human Rights Committee, 
No. R.12/52, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) (1981), available at 
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by Christian Tomuschat); Öcalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 282; see also HEIJER, 
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extraterritorial application [of human rights].”  Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in 
Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 132 (2012).  Or, as Scheinin puts it, facticity creates 
normativity.  Martin Scheinin, Extraterritorial Effect of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 73, 
75–77 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).   We suspect that the 
antagonism towards reliance on a public powers approach to jurisdiction stems less from its 
substance than from the fact that it is a notion grounded in public international law more 
generally.  In the aftermath of what many scholars understandably believed to be the wrong-
headed approach to jurisdiction taken in Bankovic—an approach allegedly grounded in 
public international law—we see an unhealthy willingness to throw the proverbial baby out 
with the bathwater.  Put simply, it does not follow that, because Bankovic was arguably an 
incorrect decision on jurisdiction grounded in public international law, any approach to 
jurisdiction grounded in public international law should be regarded with skepticism. 
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ternational law more generally on the issue of jurisdiction is, in our 
view, not only doctrinally sound—international human rights law is, 
after all, a subset of public international law159—but is also strategi-
cally wise:  the interaction between the two bodies of law has often 
been quite positive,160 affirming for example that jurisdiction may 
flow from either de facto or de jure control.161  The human rights 
value of the public powers approach to jurisdiction is clear not only 
from the result in Al-Skeini162 itself, but also, for example, from such 
decisions as X and Y v. Switzerland,163 in which an immigrant denied 
entry into Liechtenstein was held to be subject to Swiss jurisdiction 
because Switzerland legislated on immigration matters for both terri-
tories and J.H.A. v. Spain, in which Spain was found to have retained 
jurisdiction during the period the migrants were detained in Nouad-
hibou “by virtue of a diplomatic agreement concluded with Maurita-
nia.”164 
We thus believe that reliance on the public powers approach 
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to the definition of an additional basis of jurisdiction has the poten-
tial to serve as an important tool in the fight against cooperative vari-
ants of non-entrée, allowing liability to be imposed in a number of 
circumstances that arguably fall outside either the territorial or the 
personal mode of jurisdiction.  Where there is an agreement to deploy 
liaison officers or provide other forms of support that in substance re-
sult in the exercise of effective control by the sponsoring state, juris-
diction—and hence liability—is established. 
IV.  SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 
To this point we have established that responsibility for re-
foulement follows from jurisdiction and that jurisdiction can be estab-
lished when states exercise effective control over territory, authority 
over individuals, or public powers under international law.  But what 
of the situation in which more than one state can be said to have ju-
risdiction and hence incur human rights responsibility?  Effective 
control over territory is normally exclusive, but neither authority over 
individuals nor the exercise of public powers necessarily preempts 
the simultaneous jurisdiction of a territorial or cooperating state.  Can 
the state acting extraterritorially be held to exercise jurisdiction in the 
case of such non-exclusivity? 
The traditional view in human rights law was that jurisdiction 
was an all or nothing proposition.165  Since jurisdiction was the basis 
for responsibility, it followed that shared responsibility for the breach 
of human rights obligations would be implausible.  Under this classic 
approach, the developments in the law of jurisdiction set out in Part 
III would have had little practical value in contesting cooperation-
based forms of non-entrée, as the jurisdiction of the territorial state 
would ordinarily have been thought to trump a more diffuse form of 
jurisdiction.166 
Modern understandings of jurisdiction under human rights 
law have, however, largely rejected this “all or nothing” view and 
come more closely into line with the dominant position in public in-
ternational law that two or more states responsible for the same inter-
nationally wrongful act can both be held individually liable on the 
basis of their own conduct and international obligations.167  In other 
 
 165. Hess v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6231/73, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 72 
(1975) (The European Commission refused to single out the responsibility of the United 
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 166. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 145–49. 
 167. See Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 152, at art. 47; CRAWFORD, 
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words, the fact that several states have jurisdiction does not diminish 
the individual responsibility of any particular state.168  This bedrock 
principle of public international law can be seen, for example, in the 
reasoning of the ICJ in the Certain Phosphate Lands case.169  The 
Court there rejected the Australian argument that a finding of indi-
viduated liability against it was foreclosed by the fact that its trustee-
ship of Nauru was shared with New Zealand and the United King-
dom: 
Australia has raised the question whether the liability 
of the three States would be “joint and several” (sol-
idaire), so that any one of the three would be liable to 
make full reparation for damage flowing from any 
breach of the obligations of the Administering Author-
ity, and not merely a one-third or some other propor-
tionate share.  This . . . is independent of the question 
whether Australia can be sued alone.  The Court does 
not consider that any reason has been shown why a 
claim brought against only one of the three States 
should be declared inadmissible in limine litis merely 
because that claim raises questions of the administra-
tion of the Territory, which was shared with two other 
 
supra note 152, at 325−28, 333−34; André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs, Shared 
Responsibility in International Law:  A Concept Paper 15 (Univ. of Amsterdam SHARES 
Series, ACIL Research Paper No. 2011-07, 2011), available at 
http://www.sharesproject.nl/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Nollkaemper-Jacobs-Shared-
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SHARES Series, ACIL Research Paper No. 2011-01, 2011), available at 
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court-of-human-rights; James Turpin, The Jurisdictional Art of Separation:  The Role of 
Jurisdiction in the Management of Territorial and Self-determination Disputes:  Mixed 
Jurisdiction in the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides 1906−1980, (2002) 
(Ph.D. dissertation, European Univ. Inst.) (on file with author). 
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supra note 152, at 334–35.  See generally GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 100−208; 
Frank Berman, Jurisdiction:  The State, in ASSERTING JURISDICTION:  INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Patrick Capps et al. eds., 2003); Richard T. Ford, Law’s 
Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1999); Lowe & Staker, supra 
note 112, at 335−60; John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond:  Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 151 (1993).  
 169. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, 1992 
I.C.J. 240, 261−62 (June 26); see also East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 104−05 
(June 30); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 36 (April 9). 
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States.  It cannot be denied that Australia had obliga-
tions under the Trusteeship Agreement, in its capacity 
as one of the three States forming the Administering 
Authority, and there is nothing in the character of that 
Agreement which debars the Court from considering a 
claim of a breach of those obligations by Australia.170 
In line with this approach, the human rights cases Al-Skeini 
and Hirsi expressly rejected an “all or nothing” approach, finding 
that “rights can be ‘divided and tailored.’”171  Thus, for example, in 
Ilascu, the European Court of Human Rights held that both Moldova 
and Russia had exercised jurisdiction—Russia due to its decisive in-
fluence over the local Transnistrian regime, Moldova through its de 
jure sovereignty over the area—and held that simultaneous yet dif-
ferentiated human rights responsibility followed.172  Most recently, 
the Court rejected the view that the Netherlands had no jurisdiction 
over a command checkpoint in Iraq manned by its troops simply be-
cause the United Kingdom—as a formal occupying power—might 
also have jurisdiction there.  To the contrary, the Court found in 
Jaloud that a party “is not divested of its ‘jurisdiction’ . . . solely by 
dint of having accepted the operational control of . . . a United King-
dom officer.”173  The same principle has been found to apply where 
distinct actions by more than one state result in a common harm, as is 
clear from the ruling in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece determining 
that Belgium was in breach for returning the applicant to Greece con-
trary to the duty of non-refoulement, even as it found that Greece was 
itself liable for the failure to establish adequate asylum procedures 
and to avoid the ill-treatment of those seeking its protection.174 
Importantly, particularized liability may ensue even when not 
all of the states exercising jurisdiction are bound by the same interna-
tional legal obligations.  In Al-Skeini, the United Kingdom was held 
responsible under the European Convention on Human Rights even 
though it shared its jurisdiction in Iraq with the United States and 
other non-party states making up the Coalition Provisional Authority 
following the removal of the Ba’ath regime.175  Similarly, the active 
 
 170. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 1992 I.C.J., ¶ 48. 
 171. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶ 137 (2011); Hirsi Jamaa v. 
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France, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 745, ¶¶ 91–96 (1992). 
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assistance of Kenyan authorities in the arrest of the PKK leader in 
Nairobi was considered in Öcalan, yet this did not detract from a 
finding of Turkish jurisdiction for purposes of the European Conven-
tion once Turkish authorities took him into custody.176  Under this 
reasoning, the fact that a partner state is not a party to the Refugee 
Convention (as is frequently the case under cooperation-based forms 
of non-entrée) is no bar to finding the sponsoring state party exercis-
ing jurisdiction to be liable. 
Nor does it matter whether shared jurisdiction exists directly 
among the states in question or is achieved by the delegation of au-
thority to an agency or organ.177  In T.I. v. United Kingdom, the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights determined that: 
[W]here States establish international organisations, or 
mutatis mutandis international agreements, to pursue 
co-operation in certain fields of activities, there may 
be implications for the protection of fundamental 
rights.  It would be incompatible with the purpose and 
object of the Convention if Contracting States were 
thereby absolved from their responsibility under the 
Convention in relation to the field of activity covered 
by such attribution.178 
Because legal liability is not avoided when authority is dele-
gated to an international organization,179 patrols conducted under the 
auspices of such entities as the European Union’s Frontex agency 
may still engage the liability of each participating state whose offi-
cials or agents have taken part in an action that gives rise to jurisdic-
tion, and which leads to refoulement or another human rights breach.  
As much is impliedly recognized by the regulation defining the au-
thority of Frontex, which provides that “[t]he responsibility for the 
control and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member 
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States.”180 
In sum, evolution of the notion of shared jurisdiction allowing 
more than one state to be held liable for a given breach of human 
rights as a function of its own actions, whatever the liability of other 
states, is an important bulwark against cooperation-based forms of 
non-entrée that purport to leave partner states holding the ball for the 
refoulement of refugees.  As the European Court of Human Rights 
noted succinctly in Xhavara, the “Italian-Albanian Agreement can-
not, by itself, engage the responsibility of [Albania] under the Con-
vention for any action taken by Italian authorities in the implementa-
tion of this agreement.”181 
V.  AIDING OR ASSISTING 
To this point we have shown that many contemporary non-
entrée practices can be successfully challenged by reliance on devel-
opments in the law of jurisdiction, especially when coupled with an 
appreciation that shared responsibility in law may exist where more 
than one state has jurisdiction in a given context.  But, what of the 
situation where the involvement of the sponsoring state falls short of 
establishing jurisdiction, even under one of the expanded notions of 
jurisdiction described in Part III?182  For example, states are clearly 
not exercising jurisdiction when they provide only training or materi-
al assistance to a partner state.  Even when immigration officers or 
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which more than one state has simultaneous jurisdiction.  We note, however, that the term as 
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section.   See e.g., Nollkaemper & Jacobs, supra note 167. 
2015] NON-REFOULEMENT 277 
other officials are posted to another country as advisers, there will be 
no exercise of jurisdiction unless the authorities of the territorial state 
can be shown to act under the direction and control of the sponsoring 
state. 
Because there is no jurisdiction, does it follow that the spon-
soring country bears no legal responsibility for ensuing harms?  Per-
haps not.  There is an emerging consensus that international law will 
hold states responsible for aiding or assisting another state’s wrong-
ful conduct.183  This understanding is most clearly set out in Article 
16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Respon-
sibility: 
A State which aids or assists another State in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the 
latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:  (a) 
That State does so with knowledge of the circum-
stances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) 
The act would be internationally wrongful if commit-
ted by that State.184 
 
The ILC Articles are not, of course, formally binding.  Article 
16 has, however, garnered wide support as a matter of state practice 
and opinio juris.185  In the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ drew on 
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Article 16, noting that it considered the article to be an expression of 
customary international law.186  The Venice Commission of the 
Council of Europe similarly referred to Article 16 as applicable to 
European states contributing to instances of refoulement and other 
human rights abuses in the context of the U.S.-led extraordinary ren-
dition program,187 as did Judge Albuquerque in his separate opinion 
to the Hirsi case.188  This approach is very much in line with the gen-
eral view of the European Court of Human Rights that international 
human rights law is to be interpreted taking into account the law on 
state responsibility: 
[P]rinciples underlying the Convention cannot be in-
terpreted and applied in a vacuum.  The Court must 
also take into account any relevant rules of interna-
tional law when examining questions concerning its 
jurisdiction and, consequently, determine State re-
sponsibility in conformity with the governing princi-
ples of international law.189 
Article 16 regrettably does not tell us specifically what counts 
as aiding or assisting another state to breach its international legal ob-
ligations.  The commentary notes that the assistance need not be es-
sential to performing the illegal act, so long as it contributes signifi-
cantly thereto190—suggesting at the very least that action beyond 
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mere instigation is required.191  But state responsibility does arise 
where a state provides “material aid to a State that uses the aid to 
commit human rights violations.”192  The ICJ thus sensibly deter-
mined in the Bosnian Genocide case that the supply of weapons, 
military equipment and financial resources amounted to “aid and as-
sistance” by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the army of Re-
publika Srpska.193 
In line with these understandings, we believe that a state 
which takes steps such as providing maritime patrol vessels or border 
control equipment, which seconds border officials, or which shares 
relevant intelligence or directly funds migration control efforts that 
assist another country to breach its non-refoulement or other protec-
tion obligations is taking action that can fairly be characterized as 
within the ambit of aiding or assisting.  We would distinguish such 
actions from, for example, merely applying diplomatic pressure to in-
troduce or enforce exit migration controls or to sign readmission 
agreements which—while undoubtedly creating a climate within 
which rights breaches may occur—may simply be too remote from 
such harms to be deemed aiding or assisting the commission of a 
wrongful act.194  Nor do we believe that a pure act of omission, for 
example, failing to step in to prevent an instance of refoulement by 
another state, rises to the level of aiding or assisting that country to 
breach its obligations.195 
Even where the state sponsoring non-entrée takes more direct 
forms of action, Article 16 provides that the assisting state must have 
“knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful 
act.”196  Indeed, the commentary goes further, suggesting both an in-
tention and a consummation requirement, namely that aid or assis-
tance must be given “with a view to facilitating the [internationally] 
wrongful act, and must actually do so.”197  It follows that liability 
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should not follow where aid or assistance given in good faith is sub-
sequently misused by another country—for example, a state provid-
ing development aid is not responsible if, unbeknownst to it, that aid 
is used to implement border controls that lead to the refoulement of 
refugees. 
It is otherwise, however, where the sponsoring state has at 
least constructive knowledge that its contributions will aid or assist 
another country to breach its obligations and chooses to aid or assist 
notwithstanding such constructive knowledge.  For example, in Hirsi, 
Italy argued that it reasonably considered Libya to be a “safe host 
country” based on its ratification of several human rights treaties and 
the African Union’s regional refugee treaty, coupled with the express 
stipulation in the Italian-Libyan agreement requiring Libya to comply 
with international human rights law.198  Relying on these formal 
commitments, Italy argued that it “had no reason to believe that Lib-
ya would evade its commitments.”199  This argument was, however, 
soundly rejected by the Court: 
[T]he Court is bound to observe that the existence of 
domestic laws and the ratification of international 
treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights 
are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate 
protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in 
the present case, reliable sources have reported prac-
tices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities . . . . 
The Court notes again that [this] situation was well 
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 199. Id. ¶ 98. 
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known and easy to verify on the basis of multiple 
sources.  It therefore considers that when the appli-
cants were removed, the Italian authorities knew or 
should have known that, as irregular migrants, they 
would be exposed in Libya to treatment in breach of 
the Convention and that they would not be given any 
kind of protection in that country.200 
The Court’s approach aligns neatly with the general refusal of courts 
to countenance willful blindness to readily ascertainable facts.201 
Beyond the requirement of knowledge, liability for aiding or 
assisting can be imposed only where the act “would be international-
ly wrongful” if committed by both the principal state actor and the 
state said to be aiding or assisting that country.202  The starting point 
is therefore to ascertain that the conduct in question is in breach of an 
international obligation of the principal state—not a minor matter 
when, as is often the case, non-entrée cooperation is undertaken with 
a state that is not bound by the Refugee Convention or Protocol, in-
cluding such key partner states as Libya, Indonesia, and Malaysia.203  
Some would no doubt locate the required unlawfulness in the alleged 
existence of a customary legal duty of non-refoulement.204  In our 
view, the better approach would be to draw on Crawford’s view that 
Article 16(b) “merely requires that the conduct in question would 
have been internationally wrongful if committed by the assisting state 
and says nothing about the identity of norms or sources”205—thus 
opening the possibility of liability for aiding or assisting where the 
act in question is unlawful for both the principal and sponsoring 
states, albeit on the basis of distinct legal norms.206  Many partner 
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states not bound by the Refugee Convention or Protocol are nonethe-
less parties to other human rights instruments that contain a cognate 
duty of non-refoulement (though the scope of same may not in all 
cases be identical)207—thus providing the required basis for a finding 
of international wrongfulness.  For example, Libya and Indonesia 
have both ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (which has been interpreted to impose a duty of non-
refoulement at least in cases involving risk of the breach of Articles 6 
and 7)208 as well as the Convention Against Torture (which pro-
scribes return to torture in Article 3).209  Indeed, it may even be that it 
would be “internationally wrongful” for a partner state to breach the 
terms of an international non-entrée cooperation agreements—which 
often condition such cooperation on respect for refugee and other 
rights. 
The scope of the duty not to aid or assist another country to 
breach international law is not yet as fully developed in international 
human rights law as are the evolutions in regard to both jurisdiction 
and shared responsibility described in Parts III and IV.  There is 
nonetheless little doubt that a general rule of state responsibility for 
complicity or “aiding and assisting” is now accepted as a matter of 
principle even as its contours await full elucidation.210  States that be-
lieve that the more diffuse forms of non-entrée involving no exercise 
of jurisdiction are thus necessarily immune from legal liability are 
thus proceeding with false confidence. 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued here that developed states have what might 
charitably be called a schizophrenic attitude towards international 
refugee law.  On the one hand, wealthier states no longer garner the 
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sorts of direct benefit from the refugee law regime that they did in its 
early years—when it assisted them to cope with mass influxes or to 
vindicate strategic political values by “admitting the enemies of their 
enemies.”  But powerful states still wish to be seen to be committed 
to the refugee law regime, most importantly in our view because 
staying involved with refugee law is critical to being seen to stand in 
solidarity with states of the less developed world where most refu-
gees now stay.  If the developed world were to withdraw entirely 
from refugee law, the poorer states that today do the lion’s share of 
work under the regime might well follow suit—with deleterious con-
sequences for both interstate security and economic well-being, and a 
near certainty that more refugees would be compelled to seek protec-
tion in the developed world. 
The result of this schizophrenia has been the politics of non-
entrée, comprising efforts to keep refugees away from wealthy states 
without formally resiling from treaty obligations.  As the early gener-
ation of non-entrée practices—visa controls and carrier sanctions, the 
establishment of “international zones,” and high seas deterrence—has 
proved increasingly vulnerable to practical and legal challenges, new 
forms of non-entrée predicated on interstate cooperation have 
emerged in which deterrence is carried out by the authorities of the 
home or a transit state, or at least in their territory.  As we have 
shown, this new generation of non-entrée comprises a range of prac-
tices from simple diplomatic agreements to full-scale joint migration 
control operations.  The critical question we address here is whether 
such cooperation-based mechanisms of non-entrée are—as developed 
states seem to believe—capable of insulating them from legal liabil-
ity in ways that the first generation of non-entrée strategies were not. 
We believe that three evolving areas of international law—
jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability for aiding or assist-
ing—are likely to stymie many if not all of the new forms of non-
entrée.  The fact that jurisdiction, and hence liability, is now under-
stood to flow not just from territory, but also from authority over in-
dividuals in areas beyond a state’s jurisdiction and indeed from the 
exercise of public powers abroad, has dramatically expanded the 
scope of accountability for core refugee law and related human rights 
obligations.  Nor are we any longer hampered by the view that only 
one state may be held liable for the violation of human rights to 
which more than one country contributed:  to the contrary, the “all or 
nothing” optic has now given way to the view that particularized lia-
bility may ensue, and may ensue even when not all states concerned 
are bound by the same obligations.  And even when no case can be 
made for the exercise of jurisdiction under even its modern incarna-
tions, the emerging law on liability for aiding or assisting another 
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state to breach its duties under international law has enormous poten-
tial to close the accountability gaps that the new generation of non-
entrée practices seek to exploit. 
Perhaps most intriguing, it seems clear that these contempo-
rary understandings of jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability 
for aiding or assisting are most likely to be effective in contesting 
precisely the variants of the new non-entrée that appeal most to de-
veloped countries.  While legal liability is least clear where the spon-
soring state engages in only diplomatic outreach, the provision of fi-
nancial incentives, or training of personnel or provision of 
equipment, these options are increasingly viewed by developed coun-
tries as unattractive given the inherent uncertainties about whether 
there will be a solid and dependable deterrent return.  The inclination 
to become more directly involved in order to achieve more control 
and thereby to increase the likelihood of efficacy thus often pushes 
states to the more interventionist end of the spectrum of cooperation-
based non-entrée.  Yet it is when a state’s own personnel are de-
ployed in aid of deterrence abroad or where joint or shared enforce-
ment is established that legal liability becomes most clear. 
Powerful states are thus faced with a trade-off between the ef-
ficiency of non-entrée mechanisms and the ability to avoid responsi-
bility under international refugee law.  If, as we believe probable, the 
preference for more rather than less control persists, legal challenges 
are likely to prove successful.  Law will thus be in a position to serve 
a critical role in provoking a frank conversation about how to replace 
the duplicitous politics of non-entrée with a system predicated on the 
meaningful sharing of the burdens and responsibilities of refugee 
protection around the world.211  Because it would be protection rather 
than unlawful deterrence that is being shared under such a regime, no 
issue of illegality would arise.  Such a system could deliver to power-
ful states the manageability they so keenly seek, but do so in a way 
that ensures attention to—rather than avoids—the needs and legiti-
mate aspirations of both refugees and the poorer states that host them. 
 
 211. See James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law 
Relevant Again:  A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 115, 173–87 (1997).  See generally RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE 
LAW (James C. Hathaway ed., 1997). 
